Why could the plaintiff apply for a new trial in this Case？

A、in case about

B、in case

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D、in event

Nixon vs. Administrator of General Services Facts After appellant had resigned as President of the United States, he executed a depository agreement with the Administrator of General Services that provided for the storage near appellant's California home of Presidential materials (an estimated 42 million pages of documents and 880 tape recordings) accumulated during appellant's terms of office. Under this agreement, neither appellant nor the General Services Administration (GSA) could gain access to the materials without the other's consent. Appellant was not to withdraw any original writing for three years, although he could make and withdraw copies. After the initial three-year period, he could withdraw any of the materials except tape recordings. With respect to the tape recordings, appellant agreed not to withdraw the originals for five years, and to make reproductions only by mutual agreement. Following this five-year period, the Administrator would destroy such tapes as appellant directed, and all of the tapes were to be destroyed at appellant's death or after the expiration of 10 years, whichever occurred first. Shortly after the public announcement of this agreement, a bill was introduced in Congress designed to abrogate it, and, about three months later, this bill was enacted as the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (Act), and was signed into law by President Ford. The Act directs the Administrator of GSA to take custody of appellant's Presidential materials and have them screened by Government archivists in order to return to appellant those personal and private in nature and to preserve those having historical value and to make the materials available for use in judicial proceedings subject to "any rights, defenses or privileges which the Federal Government or any person may invoke." The Administrator is also directed to promulgate regulations to govern eventual public access to some of the materials. These regulations must take into account seven guidelines specified by 104(a) of the Act, including, inter alia, the need to protect any person's opportunity to assert any legally or constitutionally based right or privilege and the need to return to appellant or his family materials that are personal and private in nature. No such public access regulations have yet become effective. The day after the Act was signed into law, appellant filed an action in District Court challenging the Act's constitutionality on the grounds, inter alia, that, on its face, it violates (1) the principle of separation of powers; (2) the Presidential privilege; (3) appellant's privacy interests; (4) his First Amendment associational rights; and (5) the Bill of Attainder Clause, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the Act. Concluding that, since no public access regulations had yet taken effect, it could consider only the injury to appellant's constitutionally protected interests allegedly caused by the taking of the Presidential materials into custody and their screening by Government archivists, the District Court held that appellant's constitutional challenges were without merit, and dismissed the complaint. Held: 1. The Act does not, on its face, violate the principle of separation of powers. (a) The Act's regulation of the Executive Branch's function in the control on the disposition of Presidential materials does not, in itself, violate such principle, since the Executive Branch became a party to the Act's regulation when President Ford signed the Act into law and President Carter's administration, acting through the Solicitor General, urged affirmation of the District Court's judgment. Moreover, the function remains in the Executive Branch in the person of the GSA Administrator and the Government archivists, employees of that branch. (b) The separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence, but, in determining whether the Act violates the separation of powers principle, the proper inquiry requires analysis of the extent to which the Act prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions, and only where the potential for disruption is present must it then be determined whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within Congress' constitutional authority. (c) There is nothing in the Act rendering it unduly disruptive of the Executive Branch, since that branch remains in full control of the Presidential materials, the Act being facially designed to ensure that the materials can be released only when release is not barred by privileges inhering in that branch. 2. Neither does the Act, on its face, violate the Presidential privilege of confidentiality. 3. The Act does not unconstitutionally invade appellant's right of privacy. While he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal communications, the constitutionality of the Act must be viewed in the context of the limited intrusion of the screening process, of appellant's status as a public figure, his lack of expectation of privacy in the overwhelming majority of the materials (he having conceded that he saw no more than 200,000 items), and the virtual impossibility of segregating the apparently small quantity of private materials without comprehensive screening. When this is combined with the Act's sensitivity to appellant's legitimate privacy interests, the unblemished record of the archivists for discretion, and the likelihood that the public access regulations to be promulgated will further moot appellant's fears that his materials will be reviewed by "a host of persons," it is apparent that appellant's privacy claim has no merit. 4. The Act does not significantly interfere with or chill appellant's First Amendment associational rights. His First Amendment claim is clearly outweighed by the compelling governmental interests promoted by the Act in preserving the materials. Since archival screening is the least restrictive means of identifying the materials to be returned to appellant, the burden of that screening is the measure of the First Amendment claim, and any such burden is speculative in light of the Act's provisions protecting appellant from improper public disclosures and guaranteeing him full judicial review before any public access is permitted. 5. The Act does not violate the Bill of Attainder Clause. Affirmed. Questions 1. What is the case about? 2. Who is the appellant and who is the respondent? 3. Sum up the facts session in 3-5 sentences. 4. What do you think of the court verdict?

serve impeachment arbiters federal consent life term provide legislative dishonest practice range qualified special other In the United States system, the judge acts as an impartial referee in an adversary judicial process. In this role, the judge has a wide 1_____ of responsibilities depending on whether he sits on the 2_____ or state bench, the structure of the judicial body served, the rules and regulations of the jurisdiction, and the general environment of the jurisdiction. Generally, judges are seen as powerful 3_____ and managers in the system. They usually 4____ on a full time, full salary basis. Most jurisdictions require that a judge be a 5_____ lawyer and some require a specific period in 6_____ of the law. Generally, however, no 7_____ specific qualifications are required. Federal judges are appointed for 8 _____, on good behavior, by the President with the advice and 9_____ of the Senate. In the state system, judges are usually chosen by one of four methods, depending on the State or a jurisdiction within a State: popular election, gubernatorial appointment, 10_____ election, and merit selection. Most state judges serve for a 11_____ ranging from four years to life. No 12_____ pre-appointment training or education is required for judges, but a trend is developing in both federal and state systems to 13_____ continuing in-service training to them. Unqualified, disabled, or 14_____ judges may be removed by 15_____or, in some states, by special hearing boards.