The law of private international tribunals with respect to conflicts of interest of arbitr

ators is quite extensive, albeit by no means uniform. It relates both to what will disqualify an arbitrator and to what the arbitrator must disclose during the selection process. Most national legal systems have statutory rules as to the types of interests, relationships, and experiences that disqualify an arbitrator. Not infrequently, the disqualifying factors are identical for arbitrators and judges, although they may treat domestic and international arbitration somewhat differently, and may indeed supplement the international rules with additional features. A closer look reveals that courts and arbitration agencies tend to apply the regulations relatively lightly, recognizing that arbitrators move in the highly interconnected world of affairs, and do not stand aloof from commerce as judges do. Accordingly, acquaintanceship with the parties and their counsel does not suffice to disqualify, whereas actual business or legal connections will. In as much as judges do not seek more work, although arbitrators generally do, suspicions arise that an arbitrator's favor may incline to the party or counsel who has in the past and may again in the future provide employment.

The uncertainty in the field is at its most troubling when arbitrators are party-appointed. Some argue that such arbitrators should fulfill the same functions and satisfy the same qualifications as third-party arbitrators, others dispute any real claim to objectivity. The latter view has had considerable currency, particularly in the United States, where courts and drafters of state laws regard such advocates as pawns of the appointers. Imposing standards of neutrality and disinterestedness on them would be futile.

It follows from this dichotomy between party-appointed and non-party-appointed arbitrators that opinion on the question of their nationality is also split. A party needs to be expected to choose a fellow national. This question of nationality is acute when one party to the arbitration is a governmental agency and one or more of the arbitrators are likewise nationals; a foreign enterprise contract calling for such arbitration may be foolhardy.

The slate is largely blank with respect to rules for the conduct of arbitrators outside the field of conflict of interests. Considering only the matter of ex-parte communications, American ease law is astonishingly lax, refusing to set aside awards where such communication obtained between an arbitrator and a party without the presence of the other party, thereby violating evidentiary rules requiring the attendance of both parties. The differences in views on this topic indicate how useful a set of guidelines might he.

The best title for this passage is ______.

A．International Arbitrators: Causes and Solutions

B．Arbitrators: Causes and Solutions

C．Arbitrators: Problems in Practice

D．International Arbitrators and Conflicts of Interests